Inflation targeting and the institutional environment
Until recently, the view prevailed in the economic literature that inflation targeting depended more for its success on the quality of the institutional and macroeconomic environment than did other monetary policy régimes. The fairly strict conditions that were deemed to be a has also concluded that most of the conditions usually cited as being essential for a successful implementation of inflation targeting, in the event turn to be desirable, rather than necessary conditions. It is worth noting that the majority of these conditions are relevant not only to a policy of inflation targeting, but to any monetary policy. What is more, practice shows that applying strict technical conditions may turn out to be less important than a steady improvement of  Requirements regarding the structure of the economy: successful implementation of inflation targeting requires that prices should be free, that the economy should not be over dependent upon raw materials and that fluctuations of the exchange rate and that dollarization of the economy should be minimal;  A developed financial system: stability of the financial system during the period of introduction of inflation targeting, and efficient functioning of the transmission mechanisms of monetary policy, require a stable banking system and developed financial markets. 7 These conditions have been derived from a series of questionnaires submitted by IMF experts to the heads of a number of national central banks. 
Results of transition to inflation targeting in developed and developing countries
It should be noted that the subsequent performance of developed economies that implemented inflation targeting was superior to the subsequent performance of developing and transitional economies. Most often this is attributed to the fact that developing economies more frequently failed to achieve their inflation targets than developed ones. For example, Roger and Stone 10 assert that developing and transitional economies did not achieve their targets in 50% of cases, whereas only 33% of developed economies failed to do so (see Table   2 ). However, there were substantial differences in the conditions of policy implementation in the two groups. The results for the most part display two trends. The first is that, having gone over to the new monetary policy, developing and transitional economies, as a rule, aimed for a significant lowering of the rate of inflation. The second is that a high volatility of inflation and, accordingly, more frequent failures to attain preset targets, are characteristic, above all, of countries that aspire to a significant reduction of inflation, and not of those ones that from to year announce slightly modified targets. The experience of countries that have gone over to inflation targeting also demonstrates that poor starting conditions can be improved over a fairly short period of time. For example, according to Roger and Stone, the volatility of inflation in those countries where inflation has diminished following introduction of inflation targeting is reduced twofold in the three years that follow adoption of the new policy Generally speaking, the fact that macroeconomic indicators significantly improve as soon as an inflation targeting régime is introduced, even if the initial conditions were not particularly favorable, indicates that the belief of economic agents that the central bank will strive to achieve the set inflation target is of a great significance. According to Sherwin 11 political support for the transition to inflation targeting is crucial to the success of the policy.
It should also be noted that many countries that intend to introduce inflation targeting enjoy better macroeconomic conditions than some countries that have already made the transition. As a rule, candidates for the introduction of inflation targeting have more moderate rates of inflation, smaller budget deficits and faster economic growth. There are, therefore, grounds for assuming that such countries would derive even greater benefit from inflation targeting than the countries that acted earlier.
Political conditions favoring transition to Inflation targeting
Let us enumerate the conditions in which transition to inflation targeting is undesirable 12 and ask to what degree these conditions are present in Russia (see Table 3 ). At a time, therefore when inflation targeting is acquiring increasing support within the Russian government, the Russian economy can be said to display, for the most part, the conditions necessary for introduction of this policy. The economic crisis that the country experienced, whilst it accelerated inflation, at the same time, enhanced the importance of the interest rate policy of the Bank of Russia. This, in turn facilitated transition to inflation targeting. Therefore, in the medium term, given the necessary political will, the introduction of inflation targeting is feasible.
Aspects of the transition to inflation targeting in developing economies
There are countries where a transition to the inflation targeting seems inappropriate, but inflation targeting is a very flexible instrument of monetary policy and it can easily be adapted to take account of specific circumstances. As a rule, developing economies and transitional economies encounter economic problems that differ from those faced by A significant degree of dollarization of an economy will also impede successful transition to inflation targeting, since it can exert a strong influence on the mechanisms of delivery of monetary policy. For example, a high degree of dollarization enhances the importance of exchange rates relative to domestic interest rates; the central bank is inclined to devote greater attention to the balance of payments than to inflation. At the same time, the degree of dollarization tends to be a function of the pre-existing monetary policy and inflation targeting by itself is capable of reducing, over time, the degree of dollarization.
Finally, a successful transition to inflation targeting can be impeded by the absence of reliable statistics, and this is an area of weakness in the majority of developing countries.
Where statistics are unreliable, the implementation of inflation targeting is problematical and there is greater volatility of inflation than would otherwise be the case.
Inflation targeting and the exchange rate
During the transition to inflation targeting, some countries have to cope with significant incoming and outgoing capital flows. In a number of countries monetary regulators have attempted to combine inflation targeting and the setting of exchange rates within a fixed corridor. But in almost all of these countries, including Chile, Israel, Poland, and Hungary, a conflict arose between the need to achieve the inflation target and management of the Under inflation targeting, the exchange rate policy should not be overly pro-active.
Too strict a control of the exchange rate can destabilize other instruments of monetary policy, the real exchange rate, and make for instability in the real sector of the economy. Over rigid control over the exchange rate can redirect the concerns of the population away from inflation towards the exchange rate. There also is a risk that economic agents will misinterpret abrupt fluctuations in the exchange rate and subsequent adjustments. 15 Thus, a depreciation of the nominal exchange rate may be driven by portfolio decisions, which means it would result in a future increase in inflation. This is why monetary regulators are obliged to raise interest rates in response to an abrupt change in the exchange rate. At the same time, the depreciation of a given currency may be the consequence of a negative shift in the terms of trade that reduces demand for exports. Such a shift entails a fall in aggregate demand and would probably be accompanied by a decline in the increase in prices. It is for this reason that a reduction in interest rates is required.
proposes two simple rules, observance of which would make it possible to combine exchange rate intervention and inflation targeting:
 interest rates should be adjusted solely in response to changes in the rate of inflation;
 foreign exchange interventions should be used only as an auxiliary instrument of monetary policy.
Observance of these rules would make it possible to reduce the frequency of foreign exchange interventions and to employ them for the purpose of limiting fluctuations of the exchange rate.
Prospects for a transition to inflation targeting in Russia
As the experience of countries that employ inflation targeting shows, its use results in an improvement in macroeconomic performance. However, some countries, notably China, have been reluctant to adopt this policy, deeming it to be inconsistent with aspects of their economic strategy. By maintaining an artificially low exchange rate for the Rmb, the Chinese government has been able to achieve export-oriented growth. Recently, however, as alternative sources of growth have emerged and domestic consumption has increased, the Chinese authorities have hinted at the possibility of abandoning their rigidly fixed exchange rate.
In the case of Russia, the principal obstacle is dependence upon raw materials. When raw material prices increase, the strengthening of the ruble has an adverse effect on the export of non-raw material exports, given the increase in costs. In these circumstances, the ability of the CBR to counteract the appreciation of the ruble is limited, since it also has the task of ensuring price stability, and maintaining the exchange rate at a constant level would results in an increase in the money supply and an increase in inflation. On the other hand, producers for the domestic market can benefit from an appreciation of the ruble, since this brings down the cost of imported equipment and machinery. Finally, the Reserve fund and the National Welfare Fund can be very effective in absorbing any excess liquidity generated by a surplus Furthermore, if, as it appears, the time of extremely high energy prices has passed, this also strengthens the role of the CBR as a lender of last resort and source of liquidity in the economy. Whilst, in view of the problems described above, an official announcement by the CBR of transition to inflation targeting is unlikely in the near future, a gradual shift of emphasis in its policy from exchange-rate targeting to inflation targeting would be entirely justified. In the longer term, transition to inflation targeting will be a priority.
